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WORKFARE OR WORKHOUSE? OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY UNDER ONTARIO WORKS
SCOTT MCCROSSIN*
RtSUMk:
Cet article analyse le statutjuridique des participants aux programmes de travail
obligatoire lorsqu'ils subissent une blessure au cours de leur placement pro-
fessionnel. On y aborde tout particulibrement leur statut en vertu de la Loi sur
la santi et la sicuriti au travail et de la Loi sur les accidents du travail. En vertu
des lois r6gissant les bdn6voles, la responsabilit6 d'occupant et les asiles de
pauvres de la Poor Law England, leur statut est dgalement 6tudid pour nous
donner un nouvel 6clairage sur la nature de cette relation dans les programmes
de travail obligatoire. Cet article 6tablit que les participants aux programmes de
travail obligatoire sont sans doute couverts par les lois mentionndes plus t6t et
que les lois concernant la responsabilitd d'occupant et les asiles de pauvres
aident dgalement a ddfinir leur statut.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the implementation of "Ontario Works", many of the province's poor will
now have to work in order to receive social assistance benefits. 1 There has been
ongoing debate between people who believe that welfare recipients should give
something back to society in exchange for assistance from the state, and those
who view such requirements as punitive and degrading in nature, arising from
economic systems wholly beyond the control of the poor. The debate is not a
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1. Since October 1, 1995, the maximum General Welfare Assistance available to a single,
employable person in Ontario has been $520 per month. This is comprised of a "basic
needs allowance" of $195 for food, clothing, etc. and a maximum "shelter allowance"
of $325 for housing.
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new one. Indeed, the "workfare" of the 1990s very much resembles the "work
tests" of the 1880s and 1890s whereby all single men seeking aid in Toronto
were required to give several hours' labour breaking stone or sawing wood in
exchange for a bowl of soup, six ounces of bread, and a night's shelter.2
From whatever side one approaches the issue, workfare raises important legal
questions. In all respects, workfare participants resemble employees in terms of
the work that they are required to perform. However, they are not treated as such,
having been exempted from most legislated employment standards. 3 In the
absence of such statutory protections, questions arise as to what restrictions will
prevent the exploitation of workfare participants. The effects of workfare on the
rest of the labour market is also of interest. Will workfare replace other jobs with
less expensive labour, and put downward pressure on wages and employment
standards overall? After all, the cost of labour is not only measured by wages,
but also by the cost of compliance with other work standards. Exemption from
these standards has the potential to affect the entire labour market, with effects
ranging from the increased endangerment of the health and safety of workfare
participants to the subsequent erosion of these protections for ordinary wage-
labourers. Yet the legal status of workfare participants remains far from clear,
and thus, correspondingly, so too does that of their employers.
For social assistance recipients, these questions are of immediate concern.
Workfare participants who breach the terms or expectations of their placements
will be sanctioned by social assistance administrators, with penalties including
the loss of their benefits for up to six months. If standards set in protective
workplace legislation are violated but held not to apply to these workers, their
choice not to fulfil workfare obligations due to these violations may not
safeguard them, resulting in the loss of their only source of income. With regard
to labour legislation, workers and employers alike have rights and duties under
these laws and failure to abide by them can result in both monetary and penal
sanction. It is therefore critical to understand the position of workfare partici-
pants in relation to these laws.
In the words of Community Services Minister Janet Ecker, workfare is in a
"legal grey area".4 It is the purpose of this article to help demystify this area by
2. J. Struthers, "Can Workfare Work? Reflections from History" (Ottawa: Caledon Insti-
tute of Social Policy, 1996) at 2.
3. 0. Reg. 384/96 exempts workfare participants from all aspects of the Employment Stan-
dards Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E. 14 [hereinafter ESA].
4. M. Mittelstaedt, "Workfare Exempt from Protections" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail
(2 October 1996) A4.
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exploring the legal status of workfare participants, particularly in relation to the
Occupational Health and Safety Act5 (OHSA) and the Workers' Compensation
Act6 (WCA). In addition, the laws that relate to volunteers, occupiers' liability,
and the workhouses of Poor Law England will be considered due to their
potential to offer insight into the nature of the workfare relationship.
Overview of Ontario Works
Ontario Regulation 383/96 significantly amended the General Welfare Regula-
tion7 in order to introduce a mandatory work-for-welfare scheme to Ontario.
The new program, called "Ontario Works" by the government but more popu-
larly known as "workfare", is actually comprised of three components. These
include "employment support activities", "employment placement activities",
and "community participation activities". 8
Employment Support, in the government's words, "includes activities that
support participants in their efforts to become job-ready and access their shortest
route to paid employment, such as structured job search activities, basic educa-
tion, and job-specific skills training." 9 This is the first stage of Ontario Works
in which a new-comer to the social assistance system will be required to
participate. Lasting up to four months, it is intended to facilitate re-entry into
the workforce and ranges from structured job searches (including the provision
of resources to facilitate this) to language education (English or French).
Employment Placement, on the other hand, "is intended for participants who are
ready to find and maintain paid employment and to assist participants interested
in self-employment to develop business enterprises.' 10 This will be carried out
through "job placement agencies" in the private or non-profit sector which will
be remunerated "on a performance basis using a share of the funds that would
otherwise be paid out in social assistance to the participant.""11 This element of
the program will operate in tandem with the other two components.
5. Occupational Health & Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.1 [hereinafter OHSA].
6. Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. W. 11 [hereinafter WCA].
7. General Welfare Assistance Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 537.
8. Ibid, s. 4.3.
9. Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Program Guidelines for Early
Implementation of Ontario Works," (August 1996) at 12 [hereinafter "Program Guide-
lines"].
10. Ibid. at 16.
11. Ibid
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Third, and most important for this article, is the program component known as
Community Participation. This is the euphemism for what most people think of
as workfare. As explained in the Program Guidelines:
A Community Participation placement is any unpaid community service
activity under the direction of officials within communities and/or public or
non-profit organizations. It can be sponsored by communities and/or public,
non-profit or private-sector organizations. It includes a self-initiated place-
ment proposed by a participant, i.e. a participant can develop his or her own
community placement under the direction of a participating organization. 12
Of particular note here is that private-sector organizations are not eligible to
directly "employ" workfare participants. They are restricted to providing in-
kind support to work placements, for example, through the donation of building
tools and supplies.
The program guidelines limit participants to a maximum of six months in any
one placement, "except where a specific plan of skill training is in place, in
which case a participant may spend up to eleven months in the placement". 13
No more than 70 hours per month may be spent at a placement, while there is
no minimum. In no case may a participant be required to participate for more
hours than what would be determined by dividing his or her benefit level by the
minimum wage "plus four percent vacation pay". 14 Of these requirements, only
the 70 hour per month maximum was actually written into the General Welfare
regulations by Ontario Regulation 383/96.15 Clearly, the "minimum wage
calculation" is meant to avoid criticism that workfare is unacceptably exploiting
workers. Yet it is apparent that fair wages for the work performed (as determined
by comparison with wages paid to regular employees) are not at all factored into
deciding a participant's workfare obligation. 16 Furthermore, because benefit
levels are based on need and family size, these calculations may be discrimina-
tory in other respects as well. 17
12. Ibid at 10.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid at 38.
15. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 537, s. 4.3(5).
16. On this point, it may be worth considering the Government Contracts Hours and Wages
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. G.8. The Act calls for the payment of "fair wages" for all employ-
ees on construction or demolition jobs that are contracted-for or financially assisted by
the Government of Ontario. Quaere the status of workfare in relation to this Act.
17. See I. Morrison, "Ontario Works-Community Participation: A Preliminary Assess-
ment" (Toronto: Clinic Resource Office, July 1996) at 6.
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It is also important to note that each workfare participant will be encouraged to
sign a "participation agreement" which will set out the expectations of each
community placement and be used to keep track of the participant's progress.
Most significantly, this document will serve as a "form of notice" to participants
about their obligations under Ontario Works,18 including the "specific activities
agreed to". 19 This may become important for participants who breach these
terms and then try to argue that it was reasonable for them to do so. Under section
4.3(7) of Regulation 537, individuals who refuse to participate "without reason-
able cause" or who are not making "reasonable efforts" to fulfil their placement
requirements "shall" be refused assistance for three months-unless they have
been sanctioned previously, in which case the period "shall" be six months
pursuant to section 4.3(9). Obviously, knowing what is "reasonable" will be of
vital importance to workfare participants and their advocates.
Finally, it is important to understand the relationships between the various
parties to the Community Participation component of Ontario Works in order to
understand its legal situation. This will also be useful because this article largely
adopts the terminology used by the government in regard to workfare in order
to minimize confusion. Thus "service delivery agents" (municipalities for the
foreseeable future) deliver the entire Ontario Works program-including social
assistance benefits. These agents enter into "placement agreements" with "par-
ticipating organizations", which are public or non-profit organizations, to offer
"placements" to workfare "participants". The participants themselves report to
the service delivery agents and it is with these agents that they will be encour-
aged to sign "participation agreements". Participants and the participating
organizations with which they actually work appear to have no formal relation-
ship under the program, and any discipline or other proceedings must go through
the service delivery agents. As can be seen, the many relationships.established
by the workfare program create a complex web, and ascertaining their true
meanings and implications will be one of the first priorities in any litigation
relating to workfare.
II. IS WORKFARE EMPLOYMENT?
In September 1996, the Ontario government published regulations which pur-
port to define the status of workfare participants in relation to the OHSA and
the ESA. However, it should not be assumed that these regulations are the last
word on the matter, with a more complete exploration of the legal nature of
18. See "Program Guidelines", supra note 9 at 23.
19. Ibid. at vi (Appendix B).
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workfare being in order. First, therefore, I will consider how workfare fits into
common law definitions of "employment". I will then examine how workfare
relates to the OHSA and WCA as they modify the common law, including
consideration of the aforementioned regulations where relevant.20 I have
adopted this approach because it affords the clearest picture of the status of
workfare in relation to other potential concepts of employment. It is also useful
in gaining an understanding of what the legal status of workfare participants
might be in the absence of statutory intervention, or in the case that such
legislation is held to be inapplicable.
A. Common Law
The starting point in determining whether a relationship constitutes one of
employment is the common law. Statutory definitions then either supplement or
modify this understanding. Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd.2 1 is
generally accepted as the best statement of the law in Canada on this point. Lord
Wright established the "fourfold test" in this case, holding:
In earlier cases a single test, such as the presence or absence of control, was
often relied on to determine whether the case was one of master and ser-
vant, mostly in order to decide issues of tortious liability on the part of the
master or superior.... It has been suggested that a fourfold test would in
some cases be more appropriate, a complex involving (1) control; (2) own-
ership of the tools; (3) chance of profit; (4) risk of loss. Control in itself is
not always conclusive. 22
Applying this test, it is clear that control of workfare participants' actions does
not rest in themselves. They will be responsible to the service delivery agents
in meeting their eligibility requirements for social assistance, while subject to
the direction of the participating organizations once at the placement site. As
MacKenna J. explained in Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd. v. Minister
of Pensions and National Insurance:23
Control includes the power of deciding the thing to be done, the way in
which it shall be done, the means to be employed in doing it, the time when
and the place where it shall be done. All these aspects of control must be
considered in deciding whether the right exists in a sufficient degree to
20. Some good preliminary work has already been done with regard to the WCA, which it
will be endeavoured not to repeat here. See generally Morrison, supra note 17 at 23ff.
21. [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161 (P.C.) [hereinafter Montreal Locomotive].
22. Ibid. at 169.
23. [1968] 2 Q.B. 497, [1968] 1 All E.R. 433 [hereinafter Ready Mixed Concrete cited to
Q.B.].
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make one party the master and the other his servant. The right need not be
unrestricted. 24
Although one might argue that workfare participants voluntarily apply for social
assistance and therefore have "control" over this matter, this is ostensibly the
position of ordinary wage-labourers entering the marketplace as well, yet no one
would suggest that they are therefore not "employees". Clearly this is not what
is meant by control, as illustrated above.
The only real question is who exercises the control-the service delivery agents
or the participating organizations. The answer to this question could vary
according to the subject matter in question, and is difficult to answer devoid of
context. It will therefore be addressed in more detail later. The other factors in
Montreal Locomotive-ownership of tools, chance of profit, risk of loss--once
again do not fall within the purview of the workfare participant. Under the
fourfold test therefore, workfare participants would be considered employees,
although of whom remains unclear at this point.
Ready Mixed Concrete sought to clarify further the essence of the employment
relationship. The Court held in part:
An obligation to do work subject to the other party's control is a necessary,
though not always a sufficient, condition of a contract of service. If the pro-
visions of the contract as a whole are inconsistent with its being a contract
of service, it will be some other kind of contract, and the person doing the
work will not be a servant.25
Here the test was conceptualized in terms of distinguishing between different
kinds of contracts, as opposed to whether a contract existed at all. It is often the
case that contracts of service are sought to be differentiated from contracts for
service. This distinction under the common law is probably not important for
the purpose of workfare, where it may be that no contract exists whatsoever.
Nonetheless, other common law tests of employment in addition to the fourfold
and control tests suggest that workfare participants are employees. These
include the "part and parcel" 26 and the "economic reality' 27 tests. It is true that
workfare is a very special type of employment, however, due to the possible
24. Ibid. at 515.
25. Ibid. at 516-517 [emphasis added].
26. See Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart N.V. v. Slatford, [1953] 1 Q.B. 248 at 295, per
Denning L.J.
27. See U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1946).
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lack of a contract with an employer. As well, it remains to be determined exactly
who constitutes a workfare participant's employer, as the particular circum-
stances of any given situation may be needed to answer that question.28
B. Occupational Health & Safety Act (OHSA) 29
The first piece of legislation in relation to which the status of workfare partici-
pants will be considered is the OHSA. It will immediately be noted that the
OHSA is remedial legislation, and therefore can be assumed to have been
enacted in order to depart from the common law. Nonetheless, the common law
is the starting point from which its departure must be measured. In so doing,
however, attention should be given to the fact that common law tests of
employment have been criticized as being mainly useful in making determina-
tions of liability under tort law, with much less relevance to labour legislation.
In the context of collective bargaining, Professor Arthurs has observed:
any rationale of vicarious liability focuses ultimately on the allocation of
loss as between employer and injured third party, and not on the rights and
duties of employers and employees, inter se. The control test and its mod-
em successor, the fourfold test, are thus intended to identify those features
of the employment relationship which will permit the employer to escape
liability if he falls outside the rationale of vicarious liability.... But the rel-
evance of any of these considerations to situations where no third party is
present is purely fortuitous. The rationale of labour relations legislation is
that the public interest is best served by the promotion of collective bargain-
ing between employers and their employees. Surely any meaningful defini-
tion must be formulated in the light of this statutory purpose.30
This criticism calls for a much more purposive interpretation of labour legisla-
tion in general. As a result, some labour arbitrators have been inclined to
supplement Montreal Locomotive Works with the "part and parcel" or "organi-
zational" test in deciding whether an employment relationship exists.31
28. An example would be the case of injury to a third party. While the question of agency
and vicarious liability will come into play, that topic is largely beyond the scope of this
article, which is concerned about protective workplace legislation. Nonetheless, the
question of who is liable for the torts of workfare participants is most interesting. Some
insight into this question may be found in Part I1(c), below, with the discussion of the
status of paupers under the English Poor Law.
29. Supra note 5.
30. H. W. Arthurs, "The Dependent Contractor. A Study of the Legal Problems of Counter-
vailing Power" (1965) 16 U.T.L.J. 89 at 95 [footnote omitted].
31. See generally R. M. Parry, Employment Standards Handbook, 2nd ed. (Aurora: Canada
Law Book, 1996) at 1-3.
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Of further note is that the OHSA has been subject to a regulation concerning
workfare. 32 However, it pertains to a relatively specific part of the OHSA, with
its lack of broader application suggesting that the government does indeed view
workfare participants as being covered by the rest of the Act. But before moving
on to a discussion of this regulation, the notion of "employment" contemplated
by the OHSA will first be explored.
The determination of this matter is important, and not just from the standpoint
of employers' responsibilities towards their workers. Workers too have duties
under the OHSA. These include the duty to comply with the Act and its
regulations, for example, the duties to use appropriate safety equipment and to
report workplace dangers to the employer. Fulfilment of these obligations
requires familiarity with the terms of the OHSA. 33 While prosecutions of
workers for breaches of the Act are rare, that does not change their legal
responsibilities. These workers have the right to know their standing, particu-
larly since a person who contravenes or fails to comply with the Act is liable
under section 66(1) to a fine of up to $25,000 or imprisonment for up to 12
months, or to both. 34
"Worker"
Under section 1(1) of the OHSA, "worker" is defined as:
a person who performs work or supplies services for monetary compensa-
tion but does not include an inmate of a correctional institution or like insti-
32. 0. Reg. 385/96.
33. To illustrate the implications of coverage, and the importance of understanding the
scope of the definitions used under the Act, the following summary is provided. Sec-
tions 25 & 26 of the OHSA set out the duties of employers. They establish responsibili-
ties in the area of provision of safe equipment, safety monitoring, education, etc.,
towards workers. Similarly, section 28 sets out the duties of workers under the OHSA.
As well, Part V of the OHSA (Right to Refuse or to Stop Work Where Health or Safety
in Danger) applies to "a worker". Part VI of the OHSA (Reprisals by Employer Prohib-
ited) also speaks only to "a worker" who has made a report under the Act, including
such protections as those found in section 46 that no such worker shall be dismissed,
disciplined, or otherwise coerced or intimidated. Only Part VII (Notices), Part VIII(Enforcement), and Part IX (Offences and Penalties) use the broader term "person",
including section 66 which makes "[e]very person who contravenes or fails to comply
with" the OHSA or Regulations liable to fine or imprisonment.
34. Note also the importance of compliance with the nationally coordinated Workplace
Hazardous Materials Information System (WHMIS), which finds its genesis in ss. 33-
42 of the OHSA and is more particularly set out in R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 860. Establishing
standards and protections for those dealing with hazardous materials, the scheme also
mandates worker education and training, as well as the disclosure of confidential busi-
ness information in medical emergencies. Section 4(1) of Reg. 860 specifies that these
and other provisions apply to "employers and workers".
Workfare or Workhouse?
tution or facility who participates inside the institution or facility in a work
project or rehabilitation program
Of note is that this definition is not explicitly inclusive in scope. On the other
hand, the term "worker" is used as opposed to "employee". Given the extensive
case law interpreting the nature of the "employee-employer" relationship, it can
be assumed that "worker" was used to denote a broader category of persons than
that covered by "employee". This is especially true in light of the remedial nature
of the OHSA, which as a result should be interpreted liberally and purposively
in order to best achieve the objectives set out in it, in accordance with section
10 of the Interpretation Act.35 It is also a principle of statutory interpretation
that the law be interpreted as "always speaking", and it is arguable that the recent
introduction of workfare should not lead to the exclusion of workfare partici-
pants from the OHSA's minimal protections, but rather that the Act should be
read to include and recognize their status as workers. As Norman Keith, author
of Occupational Health and Safety Law, states:
The meaning of the term "worker" in the O.H.S.A. is much broader than the
legal meaning of the word "employee". A worker can be, but is not neces-
sarily, an employee.36
Nonetheless, the definition is not without its restrictions. For example, the
Ministry of Labour does not consider students on career training programs who
receive monetary compensation while attending classes or while with an
employer to be workers for the purposes of the OHSA:
While the students described receive some monetary compensation, their
primary role at the college is to take part in an educational program. It is
clear that they are not employees of the community college. Thus, students
in Manpower training courses at community colleges are not workers for
the purposes of the Act and are not covered by its provisions.37
Of course, this is only the Ministry's view. An adjudicator might interpret the
matter differently if an appropriate case arose. Nonetheless, it should also be
noted that workers in correctional facilities are explicitly excluded from the
definition of "worker" in the Act. As a matter of policy, one must wonder why
35. Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.11.
36. N. A. Keith, Occupational Health and Safety Law: A Complete Guide to the Law and
Procedures, with Digest of Cases (Aurora: Canada Law Book, July 1996) at 4-8.
37. Ibid. at 4-21, citing Interpretation Opinions, Legal Branch of Ontario Ministry of Lab-
our (April 2, 1982) at 3; but also referring to Interpretation Opinions, Legal Branch of
Ontario Ministry of Labour (September 22, 1982) at 2, for a contrary view.
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they too should not be protected from unsafe working conditions. And as social
assistance recipients become increasingly marginalized, there is no guarantee
how their rights as workfare participants may be interpreted. 38
It is also worth noting that the definition of "worker" under the OHSA includes
the phrase "a person who performs work or supplies services for monetary
compensation". While no mention is made of the word "contract", the concept
of an exchange of money for work appears to be an essential element of the work
relationship under the OHSA. Workfare participants arguably satisfy this crite-
rion, performing work in order to maintain eligibility for social assistance,
which may be one way of saying "for monetary compensation".
Therefore, workfare participants do seem to be "workers" under the OHSA, both
from a public policy approach and under statutory interpretation. The more
difficult task is identifying the employer.
Who is the Employer under the OHSA?
"Employer" is also defined in section 1(1) of the OHSA. It is said to mean:
a person who employs one or more workers or contracts for the services of
one or. more workers and includes a contractor or subcontractor who per-
forms work or supplies services and a contractor or subcontractor who
undertakes with an owner, constructor, contractor or subcontractor to per-
form work or supply services
On its own, this definition may not be of great assistance-saying that an
employer is "a person who employs" borders on circularity and does not get us
very far. On the other hand, a person who "contracts for the services of one or
more workers" gets us a little farther along. But in the case of workfare, the
complex web of workfare relationships comes into play. More specifically, the
question of whether the "employer" has to contract with the worker directly, or
whether instead can do so through another party, must be answered. In the
workfare scenario, participating organizations contract with service delivery
agents for the services of workfare participants, not with the participants
themselves. Are they still employers for the purposes of the Act? Or in any case,
perhaps participating organizations constitute employers under the OHSA by
virtue of the fact that they "employ" workfare participants, in satisfaction of the
first part of the definition. This interpretation is consistent with the earlier
conclusion that workfare participants are employees within the meaning of the
common law, and may be preferable.
38. See for e.g. Tozeland, infra note 101 at 922, where the appellants argued that "[t]he
position of a pauper may be analogous to that of a prisoner".
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In addressing the question of who constitutes the employer, it is important to
keep in mind the remedial purpose of the OHSA. According to Keith:
This statutory definition of an employer is broader than the traditional defi-
nition in the common law and in most employment law statutes. The defini-
tion of employer is exhaustive. 39
This conclusion is supported by a 1992 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal.
R. v. Wyssen40
The issue in this case was whether the OHSA applied to the employer of an
independent contractor. The Court of Appeal overturned two lower court deci-
sions in finding that the employer of an independent contractor was an employer
for the purposes of the Act. This case is significant because it gives an expansive
reading to the meaning of "employer" under the OHSA, both on a literal reading
of the Act and also on public policy grounds. The three judges who heard the
case concurred in the result, but divided 2-1 in their reasons. Blair J.A. (Dubin
C.J.O. concurring) considered how "employer" must be read within the context
of the entire Act, finding:
Here the definition "employer" must be considered in context with the
enforcement provisions in s. 14(1) and (2). These underline the intention of
the legislature to make an "employer" responsible for compliance with the
Act and Regulations....
The duties imposed on an "employer" by s. 14(1) and (2) are undeniably
strict and, in my opinion, non-delegable. The legislature clearly intended to
make an "employer" responsible for safety in the "workplace". The
employer's duty under the Act and Regulations cannot be evaded by con-
tracting out performance of the work to independent contractors.4 1
Blair J.A. also reflected on former definitions under workplace safety legislation
that were replaced by the consolidation of the legislation in 1979. He found:
The replacement of the former restrictive definitions of "employer" by the
expansive definition in the Act reflects the clear intention of the legislature
to make employers responsible for ensuring safety in the workplace.42
39. Keith, supra note 36 at 4-8.
40. (1992), 10 O.R. (3d) 193, 58 O.A.C. 67, 9 C.O.H.S.C. 133 (C.A.) [hereinafter Wyssen
cited to O.R.].
41. Ibid. at 198.
42. Ibid. at 199.
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One might therefore purposively read the OHSA to find the "employer" to be
the actual on-site employer at the workplace, that is, the participating organiza-
tion.
However, attention should be given to the separate judgment of Finlayson J.A.,
in which he stated that it may be possible to challenge the OHSA's definition of
"employer" under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms43 .
He found that such a challenge could arise due to the expansive reading given
to "employer" in combination with the potential penal consequences for breach-
ing the Act, particularly if the term "is so lacking in precision that it does not
give sufficient guidance for legal debate". 44 He concluded:
This tension between the worthwhile objectives of the Act and the Charter
rights of those who are swept in under the all-encompassing definition of
employer deserves to be explored.
Unfortunately, these promising Charter arguments were not raised at any
stage of these proceedings and they cannot be dealt with now. We must
await another day and a full record before subjecting this piece of legisla-
tion to Charter scrutiny.45
It is possible that such "promising" arguments may be applied to a case arising
from workfare, should the opportunity arise.
Nonetheless, the jurisprudence suggests that the actual on-site employer, which
is to say the participating organization, constitutes the employer for the purposes
of the OHSA. This most clearly meets the purposes of the Act, with only the
participating organization exercising the day to day control it envisions. This is
also the intention expressed in the Program Guidelines:
Employers that participate in Ontario Works have the same responsibilities
for occupational health and safety towards participants as they do toward
their own workers. Employers remain liable for orders made by Ministry of
Labour health and safety inspectors to correct occupational health and
safety hazards and to fulfill employers' obligations under the Occupational
Health and Safety Act towards participants, and for prosecution and the
imposition of penalties upon conviction for an offence under that Act.
43. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
44. Wyssen, supra note 40 at 202.
45. Ibid. at 203.
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Participants have the right to refuse to do tasks they consider to be unsafe
by following the procedures described in the Occupational Health and
Safety Act. 46
However, the responsibility does not end with the participating organizations.
Service delivery agents retain much control over the placements and the partic-
ipants in them. They approve participating organizations, and discipline work-
fare participants for failure to fulfil the "reasonable" expectations of their
placements. Therefore, service delivery agents must share some responsibility
for ensuring that workfare placements are satisfactory and meet the health and
safety standards required by law. Again, this is consistent with the Program
Guidelines, which state:
Service delivery agents must ensure that participating organizations are in
compliance with applicable occupational health and safety legislation, regu-
lation, and other relevant standards.47
As a result, any fault or negligence in this duty might result in service delivery
agents being held responsible along with participating organizations for viola-
tions of the OHSA. 48 While the agents may be subject to penalty under the Act,
should an action by an injured workfare participant lie in tort,4 9 they will also
share liability in this regard.50
Regulation 385/96
Ontario Regulation 385/96, made pursuant to the OHSA, purports to modify
section 9(2) of the Act. This section mandates a "joint health and safety
committee" comprised of workers and managers "at a workplace at which
twenty or more workers are regularly employed", as well as at workplaces with
fewer than 20 workers if they work with certain designated substances. Regu-
46. "Program Guidelines", supra note 9 at 37.
47. Ibid.
48. This is not to say that the OHSA itself is safe from change. The Act is currently under
review by Ontario's pro-business Tory government, and "a leaked cabinet document
shows that the goverment plans to reconsider the right to refuse unsafe work, to give
employers the power to determine who sits on workplace health-and-safety committees,
and to let employers control safety inspections." See "Right to Refuse Work Safe" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (28 November 1996) A5.
49. The applicability of workers' compensation legislation to workfare is discussed in Part
11(c), below.
50. Section 1 of the Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. N. 1, directs that when more than one
party is found guilty of negligence in connection with the same harm, the tortfeasors
shall be held "jointly and severally liable".
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lation 385/96 is structured so as to exclude workfare participants from these
counts. The Regulation establishes a definition of "ordinary worker", with its
only characteristic being that it does not include workfare participants. 51 The
Regulation then continues:
2. A workplace at which fewer than 20 ordinary workers are regularly
employed is exempted from clause 9 (2) (a) of the Act.
Section 3 of the Regulation makes a similar provision with regard to section
9(2)(c) of the OHSA.
The Regulation continues by excluding workfare participants from section 9(12)
of the OHSA, which requires certification in accordance with the Act for a
minimum number of joint health and safety committee members. This section
of the Regulation is of particular interest because it seems to exclude not only
workfare participants from the count but also volunteers, unlike the amendments
made to section 9(2) of the Act which specify workfare participants only. This
extra exclusion is accomplished through the definition of "volunteer worker"
under Regulation 385/96:
"volunteer worker" means a worker who performs work or supplies a ser-
vice but who receives no monetary compensation for doing so other than an
allowance for expenses or an honorarium.
For example, the new regulation exempts from subsection 9(12) of the OHSA:
A workplace at which fewer than 20 ordinary workers (who are not volun-
teer workers) are regularly employed. 52
While the wording of this particular section of the regulation is not as clear as
it could be, it appears to exclude both workfare participants and volunteers from
the count pursuant to which a finding of 20 workers requires certification of at
least one of them.
This regulation is important not only in its attempt to exclude these workers
from coverage under the OHSA, but also because it draws a statutory distinction
between workfare participants and volunteers. It seems to be the first statutory
definition of "volunteer" with regard to labour legislation in Ontario. As well,
the specific statutory definition and exclusion of workfare participants and
51. 0. Reg. 385/96, s. 1 states: "'ordinary worker' does not include a worker participating
in community participation activities within a program established under subsection 4.3
(3) of Regulation 537 of the Revised Regulations of Ontario, 1990 ("General") made
under the General Welfare Assistance Act."
52. 0. Reg. 385/96, s. 4(1).
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volunteers from only certain subsections 53 of the OHSA suggests that both of
these types of worker are in fact covered by the rest of the Act. 54 This lends
support to the broad reading of the OHSA suggested above, recognizing the
Act's remedial purpose and the compelling public policy reasons for its wide
application. What is of further interest is that volunteers are not excluded, unlike
workfare participants, from subsections 9(2)(a) and 9(2)(c) of the Act. Thus, it
seems, in counting workers for the purposes of determining whether a joint
health and safety committee is required under the OHSA, volunteer workers are
to be included. 55 However, these volunteers are then excluded from the count
in the subsequent determination of whether the 20 workers required to compel
certification are present. Workfare participants are, of course, excluded from
both of these counts.
Regulation 385/96 is ultra vires the OHSA
Despite the helpfulness of Regulation 385/96 in making clear the coverage of
workfare participants under the OHSA, there is some question as to its validity.
The regulation seems to be ultra vires its governing act. OHSA section 70(1)
authorizes the making of "such regulations as are advisable for the health or
safety of persons in or about a workplace." It would be hard to argue that the
exclusion of a class of workers from part of the Act could be so advisable.
Section 70(2)(1) goes on to specify that "[w]ithout limiting the generality" of
section 70(1), regulations may be made "defining any word or expression used
in this Act or the regulations that is not defined in this Act." 56 "Worker" is
defined in the OHSA, and as already argued, encompasses workfare participants
within its meaning. Therefore, the Lieutenant Governor in Council does not have
53. This is not to undermine the role of joint health and safety committees under the
OHSA. As the Report of the Royal Commission on Matters of Health and Safety Aris-
ingfrom the Use of Asbestos in Ontario, vol. 2 (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney Gen-
eral, 1984) stated at 512: "the committee structure is critically important to ... Ontario's
health and safety system".
54. Admittedly, this deduction is of limited value, but see R. Sullivan, ed., Driedger on the
Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 246: "Where the pro-
vision to be interpreted appears in the enabling Act, the regulations are often ignored.
Because regulations are a subordinate form of legislation, usually made after the
enabling Act has been passed, they have limited value in interpreting provisions of the
Act. In appropriate circumstances, however, where the Act and the regulations are
closely meshed so as to form an integrated scheme, provisions from both are interpreted
in the light of that overall scheme." [footnote omitted]
55. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("Mention of one thing implies exclusion of
another").
56. Emphasis added.
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statutory authority to limit the meaning or application of this term within the
Act.
Regulation 385/96 attempts to get around this by legislating with respect to
workplaces, not workers. This is necessary both for the preceding reason, and
also because none of the 49 categories enumerated under OHSA section 70(2)
in relation to which regulations may be made speak of "workers" or "classes of
workers", but rather only of "employers" or "classes of employers". Thus, for
example, does s. 70(2)(12) allow for regulations "exempting any workplace,
industry, activity, business, work, trade, occupation, profession, constructor or
employer or any class thereof from the application of subsection 9(2)"57, which
is in fact one of the sections from which workfare participants have purportedly
been excluded by Regulation 385/96. It will be noted that Regulation 385/96
exempts workplaces having fewer than a set number of "ordinary workers".
Because the regulation cannot not exempt workers per se, it attempts to exempt
workplaces. But it defines these workplaces in relation to their workers, and
invokes a different meaning of worker than that given under the governing act.
And as already noted, the regulations cannot define a word already defined in
the Act. The government is trying to bring in through the back door what it
cannot bring in through the front: quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, pro-
hibetur et per obliquum.58
Therefore, there is a strong argument that Regulation 385/96 is ultra vires the
Act and is invalid for that reason.59 As a result, workfare participants must be
included in any count of workers relating to the establishment of joint health
and safety committees under the OHSA. Should volunteers also be held to come
within the definition of "worker" under the OHSA, their exclusion by this
regulation would also be null and void.60
57. Emphasis added.
58. "When anything is prohibited directly, it is prohibited also indirectly."
59. Of course, this finding limits (or eliminates) the validity of the suggestion made earlier
that the regulation can be used to support a reading of the OHSA that includes workfare
participants within its definition of "worker". Nonetheless, it would seem that any party
seeking to uphold the validity of the regulation would have to concede that participants
are covered by the rest of Act's provisions, which may be of strategic value.
60. There is a problem with regard to volunteers, however. As noted earlier, the definition
of "worker" under the OHSA contemplates some form of "monetary compensation" being
given in exchange for the work performed. Unless the Act is read broadly enough to waive
this requirement (and there may be public policy reasons for so doing), volunteers presum-
ably are not covered by the Act nor can they be included in it by regulation.
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C. Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) 61
The question of whether workfare participants are covered by the WCA is also
of key importance, and perhaps most interesting to participating organizations.
This is because coverage under the WCA requires regular financial contributions
by employers on behalf of employees, and also because employees covered by
the WCA are barred by section 16 of the Act from suing their employers for any
injuries suffered in the course of their employment.
The government is clear in its intention that workfare participants will be
covered by the WCA, with agencies that direct Community Participation place-
ments having "the same responsibility to carry insurance for personal injuries
attributable to workplace accidents toward participants as they do toward their
own employees. ' 62 The situation contemplated by Ontario Works is ideal from
the point of view of participating organizations, however, with WCA costs
covered by the government while they remain protected from civil suit. This
will therefore likely only be challenged in the case of a workfare participant
injured on the job who wishes not to be covered by the WCA in order to pursue
her rights civilly in hope of greater gain. In any event, the starting point in
finding out the answers to the questions surrounding this matter is the Act
itself.63
To begin with, under section 1 of the WCA, "employer":
includes every person having in the person's service under a contract of hir-
ing or apprenticeship, written or oral, express or implied, any person
engaged in any work in or about an industry
Section 1 also defines "worker", stating the term:
includes a person who has entered into or is employed under a contract of
service or apprenticeship, written or oral, express or implied, whether by
way of manual labour or otherwise
Both of these definitions are inclusive, and thus not restricted to the enumera-
tions given. In addition, like the OHSA, the WCAuses the term "worker", which
has a broader meaning than does "employee". It is further arguable that the WCA
61. Supra note 6.
62. "Program Guidelines", supra note 9 at 37.
63. It should be noted that the WCA is facing major legislative changes scheduled to take
effect on July 1, 1997 which will affect entitlements and redefine some key terms of the
Act, including changing the name of the Workers' Compensation Board to the Work-
place Safety and Insurance Board. See J. Rusk, '"CB Benefits, Premiums to Drop"
The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (27 November 1996) A6.
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is a statute in pari materia with the OHSA, as the health and safety legislation
makes reference to the WCA at a key place-the source of funding for its
administration (section 22). As a result, the conclusion that workfare partici-
pants are covered by the OHSA strengthens the argument that they are also
covered by the WCA. As well, the WCA is remedial legislation and as such
requires a liberal interpretation.
Nonetheless, in both the definitions of "employer" and "worker" under the
WCA, it seems that some form of contract is contemplated. And once again, we
are faced with the task of untangling the workfare relationship in order to see
how the notion of contract fits into the Act. It is difficult to find a contract of or
for service in the case of a workfare participant, at least as traditionally
conceived. However, it is impossible to ignore that at some level, workfare
participants are providing their labour in exchange for social assistance benefits.
The question is whether a legal remedy would lie for a failure or refusal to
provide benefits if the required work is actually performed, and if so, what the
nature of the remedy would be.64 The source of the confusion may be that it
remains unclear if social assistance is monetary compensation for the labour
performed, or alternatively if the labour is a condition of eligibility for the social
assistance. It appears to be the latter. General Welfare Assistance remains an
entitlement-the law states that it "shall" be provided to any person in need
"who is eligible for such assistance. '65 Workfare is merely one of the conditions
of eligibility, as established by the regulations. In any event, the importance of
finding a contract may be overemphasized, especially considering the several
reasons already given why workfare falls within the WCA's scope of coverage.
64. To this end, it may be helpful to consider the distinction drawn under the Poor Law
between contractual employment and statutory employment, in Part RII(c), below. On
the other hand, see Ghent v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 183 Cal. App.
3d 1167, 228 Cal. Rptr. 631 (Ct. App. 1986) [hereinafter Ghent cited to Cal. Rptr.] at
635: 'The real issue of this case is the status of the work performed and the aid
received.... We hold that Ghent's participation in the County's work relief program
and receipt of aid therefrom did not establish either a statutory or common law employ-
ment relationship between the County and Ghent."
65. General Welfare Assistance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. G.6, s. 7(1). On this point, also con-
sider the argument of the welfare department in Ghent, ibid at 632: "Under California
Law relief payments are mandatory where the individual applicant meets the condition
of eligibility. Any work which may be required of a recipient of relief is a condition
subsequent and not precedent to the determination of need and the allowance of aid.
The aid is not wages in the first instance but a subsistence allowance nor does it become
wages when services are performed by the recipient on a relief project. Relief project
work is created for rehabilitation and morale purposes. Engaging in such does not place
the claimant in employment nor establish a bona fide employer-employee relationship."
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It will also be noted that section 63 of the WCA does give the Workers'
Compensation Board (WCB) power to make regulations in relation to Part I of
the Act (Compensation), subject to the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in
Council. There is not any provision for the government to bypass the Board and
directly make regulations itself. In reality, however, a government wishing to
make a change will seek the Board's cooperation, which is given as a matter of
routine. Presumably, therefore, section 63 would be the basis for any wholesale
designation of workfare participants as "workers" for the purposes of the Act.
But section 63 does not specifically authorize any regulations relating to the
meaning of "worker". Only the definition of worker itself does so, where section
1 allows the term to include:
(c) a person deemed to be a worker of an employer by a direction or order
of the [Workers' Compensation] Board ...
It would seem that any wholesale designation of a class of persons to be
"workers" under the Act would have to be in addition to the power of the Board
under the above definition. This deeming provision seems only to contemplate
an individual person. Other sections of the WCA and other labour legislation
speak of classes of persons, workers, and employers. Part (c) of the definition
of "worker" does not do so, and therefore seems unable to authorize the Board
to make a wholesale declaration that all workfare participants are workers for
the purposes of the WCA. In order to accomplish this, the definition would have
to read "a person or class ofpersons deemed to be a worker" by the Board. Thus,
it appears that the WCB only has power to make such designations on a case by
case basis, with a broader ability to effectively expand or amend the Act's
definition of "worker" being ultra vires the Board.
Who is the Employer under the WCA?
There remains the question of who the employer of a workfare participant is
under the WCA. It might be argued that service delivery agents are the employ-
ers, which would protect the integrity of the workfare program by easing the
fears of participating organizations in the event that a workfare participant
attempts a civil action. In support of such a contention, one could point to the
participation agreements which the service delivery agents will hope to have
signed with each workfare participant. This could be coupled with the fact that
service delivery agents share responsibility with participating organizations to
ensure the proper administration of the WCA.66 On the other hand, it could be
argued that the government is the employer, particularly considering that it is
the government that has required the participant to work in the first place and
66. "Program Guidelines", supra note 9 at xiv (Appendix E).
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that is paying the workers' compensation costs of workfare participants. In either
case, the role of the participating organizations could be explained with refer-
ence to section 3 of the WCA, which deals with "seconded workers". 67
In Humberstone v. Northern Timber Mills6 8, which MacKenna J. quoted in
Ready Mixed Concrete, Dixon J. had to determine whether a person was a
servant for the purposes of workers' compensation. He held:
The question is ... whether ultimate authority over the man in the perfor-
mance of his work resided in the employer so that he was subject to the
latter's order and directions. 69
This formulation can also assist in determining who the employer is with regard
to the WCA, and supports the conclusion that it is the service delivery agent.
The agents have ultimate control of the workfare placement, approving each
participating organization and the terms of each participant's placement. Once
the workfare program is in place, the government's authority is too remote to
consider it to be the employer for the purposes of the Act.
On the other hand, it may be that the participating organizations are the
employers. This would fit naturally with the workplace safety scheme overall,
similar to what was noted with regard to the OHSA. However, it does not seem
that such a holding would reflect where the responsibilities under the WCA
actually lie. In the end, however, the question may only be important in so far
as employers under the Act are protected from civil suit by section 16. As long
as workfare participants are held to be covered by workers' compensation, it
may not be important for them to ascertain precisely who their employer is,
because whoever it is, the participant has recovered and presumably therefore
is barred from suing. In the alternative, the workfare participant may be held
not be covered by the WCA, in which case the determination of who the
employer is under the Act may be unnecessary, with other tort principles coming
into play.
Blum v. Glastonbury Housing Authority 70
Notwithstanding any determinations of who constitutes a "worker" or
"employer" under the WCA, a court may nonetheless decide not to bar a
67. Section 3 states: "Seconded workers: Where the services of a worker are temporarily
lent or hired out to another person by the person with whom the worker has entered into
a contract of service, the latter person is deemed to continue to be the employer of the
worker while the worker is working for the other person."
68. (1949) 79 C.L.R. 389.
69. Ibid. at 404.
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workfare participant from suing civilly if injured on the job. Workers' compen-
sation is part of the ostensible employment bargain, seen as an efficient and
predictable compromise to meet the needs of employers and employees alike,
especially given the common law alternative. But a person injured while on a
workfare placement has not participated as freely in making this bargain, and it
is therefore arguable should not give up common law rights to sue for more than
what is available from workers' compensation. Only one case could be found
on this point, an American decision in which the court held:
worthwhile as these [workfare] programs may be (and it is not for the court
to have an opinion on that, it is the law) it is also true that workers in these
programs do not represent free labor entering the marketplace able to chose
[sic] their employer and to some extent negotiate the terms of their employ-
ment. Thus some at least of the underpinnings on which the Worker's Com-
pensation system is based do not exists [sic] so query how fair it is to
require such workers to give up their common law right to sue.7 1
In this case, the injured worker had already recovered under the workers'
compensation system. The judge did not find that to be an obstacle, however,
stating that the plaintiff would merely have to reimburse workers' compensation
from any recovery he subsequently made in a civil action. Therefore, it is not
certain that participating organizations will be protected from actions in tort for
injuries suffered by workfare participants.
Furthermore, workfare participants may find many reasons to pursue such a
course of action. The workers' compensation scheme in general is becoming
less attractive to workers, for example, as benefit levels are reduced, pensions
de-indexed for inflation, and "deemed earnings" provisions applied in question-
able manners. In addition, the calculation of a participant's workers' compen-
sation benefits in a wage-loss system based largely on pre-injury earnings
presents many problems. Morrison points to the Board's ability to determine the
earnings of apprentices, learners, and students under section 14 of Regulation
1102 (R.R.O. 1990) should this be the. status of workfare participants, and
provides a discussion of this issue in general. 72 He also notes that there is
potential for participants merely to be shuffled between workers' compensation
and social assistance, and not to their advantage.73 Should this prove to be the
70. (17 July 1995) No. CV92 0518876S (Conn. Super.), 1995 Westlaw 441880, 1
[hereinafter Blun].
71. Ibid. at3.
72. Supra note 17 at 26ff.
73. Ibid. at 27.
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case, workers may have nothing to lose financially by leaving the no-fault
workers' compensation system, and perhaps much to gain under the fault-based
tort system in the areas of non-economic and punitive loss. Of course, this
assumes an ability to access the civil court system, which may be highly
questionable for a person in the position of an injured workfare participant.
The WCB's Position on Workfare
The discussion on workfare and workers' compensation thus far has focused on
the situation in the absence of statutory intervention. As noted previously, the
government has already passed legislation on this matter in relation to both the
OHSA and the ESA. The question might arise as to why this was not done with
regard to the WCA.
The reason appears to be that the government saw no need to do SO.74 The
Ministry of Community and Social Services did approach the Board for an
opinion about where workfare participants fit into the workers' compensation
scheme. The Board took the view that workfare participants fall within its policy
guidelines dealing with persons on unpaid training placements, and therefore
are covered by its general funding agreement with the government. Pursuant to
this agreement, the government is responsible for paying all accident costs of
workfare participants. 75 The employers of the workfare participants, according
to the Board, are the participating organizations (who are therefore protected
from legal liability), while the government remains responsible for the costs
associated with workfare injuries.
However, the Board's approach has many shortcomings. The definition of
"worker" under the WCA does include "a learner or student", with the following
definitions given for those terms under section 1 of the Act:
"learner" means a person who, although not under a contract of service or
apprenticeship, becomes subject to the hazards of an industry within the
scope of Part I for the purpose of undergoing training or probationary work
specified or stipulated by the employer as a preliminary to employment
"student" means a person who is pursuing formal education as a full-time or
part-time student and is employed by an employer for the purposes of the
employer's industry, although not as a learner or apprentice
74. Interview by telephone with Elizabeth Brown, Counsel, Workers' Compensation Board
Legal Branch (29 November 1996) Toronto.
75. The Crown is an employer falling under Schedule 2 (paragraph 9) of the WCA.
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Workfare participants clearly are excluded from the definition of student. And,
while perhaps less obviously so, they are also well outside of the Act's definition
of learner, which requires that the work in question must be stipulated by the
employer and be preliminary to employment. While eventual employment for
workfare participants may be a hope of the program administrators, it can be
little more than that. From the standpoint of participating organizations, there
is surely almost no chance or even intention of hiring the multitude of social
assistance recipients who will be required to participate in workfare.
While it is probably impossible to get around the above definitional obstacle,
the only chance of doing so would be for program administrators to ensure that
workfare participants are carefully matched to placements based on the skills
they possess. As Ian Morrison explains:
There is a fundamental ambiguity at the heart of the Community Placement
program as to whether the program is a means for people to contribute work
of value to the community or a training/work experience program. If it is
the former, people should be selected to participate based on their current
knowledge and skills. If it is the latter, people should be assigned to learn
something that they don't know how to do, and someone will have to teach
them. 76
The Program Guidelines claim that it is both:
The purpose of Community Participation is to enable participants to con-
tribute to their community while receiving social assistance and to build
some basic networks, valuable experience, and employment-related skills to
help them move into the paid labour force.77
The government has provided examples of the types of placements through
which these goals can be met:
Participants could clean up garbage and old logs from area rivers and
streams.... Participants could help clean up local lakes and restore barren
lands by planting trees. ... Participants could develop and maintain snow-
mobile trails. 78
It is interesting to compare these activities to those of the stone-breaking,
wood-chopping poor of the 1880s. One might be excused for finding irony in
the words of then-Minister of Community and Social Services David Tsubouchi
76. Morrison, supra note 17 at 2.
77. "Program Guidelines", supra note 9 at 10.
78. Ministry of Community and Social Services, News Release 96-24, "People Will Work
for their Welfare Cheques Starting this September" (12 June 1996) at 5.
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that "[w]e are truly moving social assistance in this province from a hand-out
to a hand-up". 79
In the end, the WCB's view on the status of workfare participants is fundamen-
tally flawed. It is supported neither by the WCA itself nor by the nature of the
workfare program and the relationships constructed by it. Workfare participants
are not trainees under the Act, and any analysis of their status must be
approached in the manner set out previously.80
11. WORKFARE: SOME ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES
The discussion thus far has proceeded on the basis that workfare constitutes
"employment", both under common law and remedial workplace safety legis-
lation. However, it remains possible for the courts to conceive of this relation-
ship differently. This section will explore alternative perspectives of the legal
status of workfare and workfare participants in such an eventuality. But even if
the previous conclusions are correct and workfare participants are employees,
the following discussion serves a useful purpose in further illuminating the
nature of the workfare relationship. This will be particularly helpful in assessing
the legal status of workfare participants in areas in which they are not covered
by statute, for example, in the area of employment standards legislation. 8 1
The discussion continues to focus on the rights of workfare participants, espe-
cially in situations where they suffer injury at work. Their rights under tort law
will be explored, which once determined, will help us to understand the corre-
sponding duties owed to them. Again, it will be important to understand who
the masters82 of workfare participants are. The article will proceed to reason by
79. Ibid at 1. As Ontario Works slowly unfolds, a better picture is developing of the types
of workfare placements which are actually being implemented. A "Community Place-
ments Update" by Bob Barraclough, Placement Coordinator in North Bay, lists tour
guide, office clerk, outdoor science facilitators, maintenance workers, chainsaw opera-
tor trainees and troubleshooting mechanic among its approved placements as of January
16th, 1997.
80. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that most workfare placements will be lim-
ited to six months, with only those having specific training programs in place being
allowed to last up to a maximum of eleven months: see text accompanying note 13.
81. Although it will not be dealt with in this article, it should be noted that workfare partici-
pants likely do fall under the protection of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O.
1990, c. H.19, which is an important source of workplace rights. This is certainly the
view taken by the government: see "Program Guidelines", supra note 9 at xi (Appendix
C). For a concurring opinion which also highlights some potential concerns in this area,
see Morrison, supra note 17 at 13ff.
82. The term "master" is not ideal, but may be the best of available options. It is recognized
that the common law relationship of "master and servant" implied an employment rela-
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analogy, beginning with workfare participants in relation to volunteers,
occupiers' liability, and finally workhouse paupers under the English Poor Law.
A. Volunteers
There have been some suggestions that the legal status of workfare participants
resembles that of volunteers. Yet, intuitively there appear to be many differences
between the two. Mandatory work in exchange for social assistance does not
quite capture the seemingly altruistic spirit of traditional voluntarism. 83 Black's
Law Dictionary defines "volunteer", inter alia, as:
A person who gives his services without an express or implied promise of
renumeration. One who intrudes himself into a matter which does not con-
cem him.. . when he is not legally or morally bound to do so84
A distinction between workfare and voluntarism has already been made in
Regulation 3 85/96, made pursuant to the OHSA.85 Even people in the volunteer
sector are keen to maintain the difference. 86 Yet some might argue that applying
for social assistance is a voluntary act, and therefore, by extension, so too is any
work undertaken as a result thereof. But such a conclusion is soundly rejected
by all existing authority on the matter.
Tozeland v. Guardians of the Poor of the West Ham Union87 is a case on point.
The decision of the English Court of Appeal in this case will soon be considered
in some depth, but for the moment we will concentrate on the ruling of the
tionship--precisely what is sought to be avoided here. Nonetheless, several cases per-
taining to the Poor Law adopt the term to refer to a person who has control over a pau-
per in a workhouse, even though this was not considered to be "contractual
employment". Slavery imports yet another meaning to the word. Black's Law Dictio-
nary, 6th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1990) defines "master", inter alia, as "[o]ne hav-
ing authority, one who rules, directs, instructs, or superintends". It will therefore be
used in this discussion.
83. For a critical discussion of workfare as is pertains to voluntarism, see Workfare Watch,
vol 1:3 (Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, November 1996). This orga-
nization also serves as a repository of workfare-related information, including resolu-
tions from the volunteer sector opposed to workfare, much of which has been made
publicly available via the internet: see http://worldchat.comlpub-
lic/tab/wrkfrw/wrkwtch.htm.
84. Supra note 82.
85. See Part I1(b), above.
86. See J. Gadd, "Workfare puts Volunteering at Risk, Report Warns: People Likely to
Balk at Being Mistaken for Forced Workers Under Confusing Ontario Plan, Groups
Say" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (24 October 1996) A7.
87. [1906] 1 K.B. 538.
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Divisional Court on the matter of the doctrine of common employment, with
which the Court of Appeal was in full agreement. 88 The issue was whether the
doctrine of common employment was a defence to an action arising from injury
caused to a pauper in the course of workhouse duties. Lord Alverstone C.J. held:
When a pauper goes into the workhouse he does not know what work he
may be called upon to perform, and it seems to me an unjustifiable exten-
sion of the doctrine of common employment to say that for a man to go in a
starving condition into the workhouse is equivalent to a contract on his part
to do any work that he may be ordered to do as though he were a servant
who could refuse to do it. The option or choice which the servant has to
exercise must be an option or choice with reference to the work, and I can-
not think that we are at liberty to disregard the compulsion of hunger, which
drives a man into the workhouse, and to say that under such circumstances
a man goes into it voluntarily in the sense in which a servant voluntarily
enters an employment.89
Ridley J. agreed, expressing it this way:
Then it was contended that the plaintiff was only a volunteer, and in one
sense that is true: he was a volunteer in so far as he got into the workhouse
by his own voluntary act, but he was not a volunteer as to the work which
he should do as an inmate, and the application of the doctrine of common
employment must depend on his voluntary consent to that work; the doc-
trine cannot apply merely because at an antecedent period he voluntarily
entered the workhouse.90
Although only two cases on this point were found in a search of American
workfare jurisprudence, both are supportive of the notion that workfare partic-
ipants are not volunteers. In Blum, which was quoted under the discussion about
workers' compensation, the Court pointed to the lack of free choice workfare
participants have in relation to their placements in preserving for them the right
to sue. 9 1 Although not quite on point, another recent American case that speaks
to the nature of the workfare relationship is Manley v. YMCA of Plainfield.92 In
Manley, the YMCA argued that charitable immunity status protected it from
being sued by a workfare participant injured during a placement there. The "Y"
88. See Tozeland, infra note 101 at 923. The Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the
Divisional Court on other grounds.
89. Supra note 87 at 544.
90. Ibid. at 547.
91. Supra note 70.
92. 646 A.2d. 1163 (N.J.Super.L. 1994) [hereinafter Manley].
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apparently argued that providing the participant with a placement enabled him
to obtain social assistance, and that he therefore was a beneficiary of its charity.
The judge held contrariwise:
Permitting someone to perform labor free of charge, as a condition to
receiving welfare benefits, cannot by any stretch of the imagination equate
with the plaintiff himself receiving a benefit from the YMCA... it was the
plaintiff who was rendering a benefit to the defendant, not the other way
around. The true beneficiary of the YMCA's charitable work was the City
of Plainfield Welfare Department which required the plaintiff to work as a
condition for benefits. The plaintiff was in effect no different from the
employee... who was obligated to engage in work at the direction of his
employer93
The Court seemed to be acknowledging the compulsion inherent in a workfare
relationship, again displacing the notion of voluntariness.
Therefore, it would appear that the law as it pertains to volunteers cannot be
taken as a guide to the law as it pertains to workfare participants. Regardless of
from what perspective one considers the question-common usage, common
sense, 94 or common law-the result is the same: workfare participants are forced
to labour for their benefits and cannot be considered volunteers.9 5
B. Occupiers' Liability
In any event, workfare participants will be owed a duty of care under the
Occupiers'Liability Act96 (OLA). The fact that we have returned to the common
law to ascertain some aspects of the workfare relationship does not mean that
we should also do so for the purposes of occupiers' liability. Although a large
body of common law exists in relation to dangerous premises, section 2 of the
OLA specifies that the Act supersedes the common law. And while section 9(2)
of the OLA makes it clear that the Act does not affect "the rights, duties, and
liabilities resulting from an employer and employee relationship where it
exists", we are proceeding on the assumption that such a relationship does not
93. Ibid. at 1165.
94. The reference is to Ontario Regulation 385/96, which statutorily defines "volunteer".
The legislation was passed by Ontario's Progressive Conservative government, which
was elected in June 1995 under the slogan of the "Common Sense Revolution".
95. An interesting aside, however, is that social assistance recipients for whom Ontario
Works is not mandatory (such as seniors and persons with disabilities) may nonetheless
participate on a voluntary basis. They would not be subject to sanction for failure to ful-
fil any of the program goals. Quaere the legal status of these participants.
96. Occupiers' Liability Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.2 [hereinafter OLA].
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exist, neither under common nor under statute law. In any case, it may well be
that an employment relationship would only serve to augment these duties, for
example, through the OHSA.
Under the common law, the duty of care owed by an occupier to an entrant upon
land was less stringent than that required by the law of negligence. The status
of the entrant determined the requisite standard of care, with there being three
main categories: invitees, licensees and trespassers. Section 3(1) of the OLA,
subject to limited exceptions in section 4, replaces the common law with the
following duty:
An occupier of premises owes a duty to take such care as in all the circum-
stances of the case is reasonable to see that persons entering on the prem-
ises, and the property brought on the premises by those persons are
reasonably safe while on the premises.
Furthermore, section 3(2) makes it clear that this duty "applies whether the
danger is caused by the condition of the premises or by an activity carried out
on the premises. ' 97 Therefore, the activities required of workfare participants
by their placements or otherwise ongoing at the worksite will be subject to the
occupier's duty to ensure that the premises are "reasonably safe". Furthermore,
one might argue that standards established under such statutes as the OHSA
represent the best guide as to what constitutes "reasonable" for the purposes of
the OLA in relation to employment-type activities.
Section 4(1) of the OLA states that the duty of care provided for in subsection
3(1) does not apply "in respect of risks willingly assumed by the person", in
which case the duties are only "to not create a danger with the deliberate intent
of doing harm or damage" and "to not act with reckless disregard of the presence
of the person" on the premises. One might argue that workfare participants, by
entering the premises of their workfare placements, willingly assume the risks
thereof. However, this returns us to the discussion that took place earlier with
regard to volunteers, in particular the discussion pertaining to the doctrine of
common employment. The argument will not be repeated here, but it is directly
on point in holding that persons in the positions of workfare participants do not
voluntarily, or "willingly", assume any risks associated with their work.
Finally, section 5 of the OLA addresses the ability to contract out of the duty
imposed under the Act. It is possible that service delivery agents may attempt
to excuse participating organizations from liability under the OLA in their
97. Emphasis added.
Workfare or Workhouse?
placement agreements. However, subsection 5(1) strictly forbids this possibil-
ity:
The duty of an occupier under this Act, or the occupier's liability for breach
thereof, shall not be restricted or excluded by any contract to which the per-
son to whom the duty is owed is not a party, whether or not the occupier is
bound by the contract to permit such person to enter or use the premises.
On the other hand, subsection 5(2) of the OLA does allow for contracts to extend
liability to third parties beyond the standard of reasonable care, including
liability for the actions of persons not under the occupier's direction or control.
While this is not likely to become a prominent feature of placement agreements,
it may be appropriate for particular workfare placements and should remain
open to further consideration.
In summary, the OLA imposes a standard of reasonable care on the occupier of
premises. Whatever other regime covers workfare participants, they will also
be protected by the terms of this Act.
C. Workhouses, Paupers, and the English Poor Law
The final category which will be examined is that of paupers under the English
Poor Law.98 We have already considered some material from this era as it relates
to the "voluntary" nature of workhouse labour. Although the cases to be
examined were decided under statute, the legal relationships in existence at that
time bear remarkable similarity to those which exist today with regard to
workfare. Considerable attention will therefore be devoted to the case law which
developed as a result, as it may well serve an important role in interpreting the
legal situation of present-day workfare participants in Ontario.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, cases decided under the Poor Law are few and far
between, not withstanding its 300-year history.99 Undoubtedly, access to justice
for the poor was even worse in Poor Law England than it is now in Ontario. 10
98. An extensive amount of literature exists about the Poor Law. General historical
accounts include: J.J. Bagley & A.J. Bagley, The English Poor Law (London: MacMil-
lan Press, 1966); P. Slack, The English Poor Law 1531-1782 (London: MacMillan
Press, 1990); and M. E. Rose, The English Poor Law 1780-1930 (New York: Barnes &
Noble, 1971).
99. See Dunbar v. Ardee Guardians, [1897] 2 I.R. 76 at 84, where Fitz Gibbon L.J. refers
to the "paucity of authority".
100. In this regard, see Poverty in Canada: Report of the Special Senate Committee on Pov-
erty (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), where the Committee quotes from the brief of
Osgoode Hall Law School's Community Legal Aid and Services Program at 147:
"Those of you who are lawyers and those of us who are students look at the Canadian
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Nonetheless, some cases did make it to the courts, and the decision of the English
Court of Appeal in Tozeland v. Guardians of the Poor of the West Ham Union10 1
is instructive for present purposes.
To understand Tozeland, and how it relates to present-day workfare in Ontario,
some knowledge of the workhouse system is required. Like the Community
Participation component of Ontario Works, workhouses under the Poor Law
envisioned a series of complex relationships. 102 Local Government Boards were
created and given responsibility (by statute) to direct and oversee the adminis-
tration of relief to the poor. "Poor Law Commissioners" sat on these Boards,
and one of their powers was the ability to form and dissolve "unions". These
unions had many functions, in particular the building and administering of
"workhouses". "Guardians" were elected to direct the unions, and included
among their responsibilities was (upon the direction of the Commissioners) the
appointment of "officers", who were paid employees, to assist in running the
workhouses.
The parallels between the Poor Law and present-day workfare are very strong.
The role of local government boards can be likened to that of service delivery
agents under Ontario Works. Both bodies are responsible for implementing a
statutory program of aid to the poor, including the requirement of work in
exchange for "relief". While local government boards then contracted with
unions to deliver and administer the program, service delivery agents will enter
into placement agreements with participating organizations to much the same
end. Then, just as paupers performed labour in the union workhouses, workfare
participants will labour for participating organizations. Workhouse officers
correspond to the employees of participating organizations, with union guard-
ians corresponding to participating organizations' directors. One significant
difference is that under the Poor Law the boards had the power to form and
Income Tax Act and see thousands and thousands of cases where points in dispute in
that act have been clarified by the Courts and the Tax Appeal Board. If you look at the
General Welfare Assistance Act in Ontario, there is not a single case that has ever been
litigated under that act. [... ] And, surely, we are not to conclude from that that there
were no problems in interpretation. Surely what we are to conclude is that the poor
whose lives are substantially ruled by people who have control over the funds ... have
never had an opportunity to have their tights interpreted."
The situation has undoubtedly improved with the establishment of community legal
clinics in Ontario over the past 25 years, but even now significant obstacles to the poor
remain. Meanwhile, the clinic system and its funding are under threat from government
cutbacks.
101. [19071 1 K.B. 920 (C.A.) [hereinafter Tozeland].
102. See generally ibid. at 924.
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dissolve unions, whereas in Ontario the participating organizations will already
exist in the public or non-profit sector independent of the service delivery
agents' will. With this basic knowledge, we can now turn to the case at hand.
Tozeland 103
Mr. Tozeland was a fifty-seven year old man, a cigar-box maker by trade. He
had been an "inmate" of a workhouse for just over three months. One day, Mr.
Tozeland was directed to assist an official of the workhouse, Byers, who was an
electrician, in some work pertaining to a recently installed electric light in the
workhouse infirmary. The work was being performed under the supervision of
a man by the name of Baird, also a workhouse official, who was the infirmary's
engineer. A staging had been made consisting of a board supported by a pair of
steps at one end and a ladder at the other. Unfortunately, while Mr. Tozeland
was working on the staging, it collapsed, throwing him to the ground. As a result
of his injuries, his leg had to be amputated. It was admitted that Baird was
responsible for the security of the staging, and he was subsequently found guilty
of negligence. Mr. Tozeland sued Baird's employer-the guardians of the
workhouse union-for damages.
At trial, the county court judge found "that the case could not be put more
favourably for the plaintiff than as one of master and servant", 1°4 and that since
Baird was an employee of the workhouse, the doctrine of common employment
applied and was a defence to the action. This was overturned on appeal to the
Divisional Court, which held that the doctrine of common employment did not
apply because the plaintiff was not in a position to voluntarily take upon himself
the risk of injury. 105 Judgement was given in favour of Mr. Tozeland. The
guardians appealed further.
The decision of the Court of Appeal essentially hinged on the nature of the
relationship between Mr. Tozeland and the poor law guardians. The President
of the Court, Sir Gorell Barnes, referred to "[t]he exceptional character of a case
of this kind" 1°6 due to overall control of the situation being given by statute to
one body, with the actual power of carrying out the arrangements assigned to
another, which is to say the relationship of the Local Government Board to the
guardians of the union. On this point, the Court relied extensively on a case of
a similar nature decided by the Irish Court of Appeal, Dunbar v. Ardee Guard-
103. Ibi.
104. Supra note 87 at 539.
105. See Part 11(a), above.
106. Tozeland, supra note 101 at 924.
(1997) 12 Journal of Law and Social Policy
ians1 ° 7 , in which the plaintiff sued the guardians for negligence which resulted
in the death of her son, a patient in a workhouse infirmary. President Barnes
cited with approval the following passage from Fitz Gibbon L.J. of the Irish
Court of Appeal:
I think the idea would never occur to anyone entering a workhouse hospital
that the guardians were further liable to insure the recipient of relief against
the negligence of the persons employed to give it. Such persons would be liable
for their own acts or defaults, but I cannot hold that those personal acts or
defaults of the subordinates are, in law, the acts of the guardians, nor are they
acts which the guardians.. assumed the responsibility of doing through their
servants.... the guardians are not answerable, in damages, for any injury
caused by the neglect or default of the master in the discharge of what were
his duties under the statutes and regulations affecting his office. 108
President Barnes then continued in his own words:
there may be a difference at first sight between the duty to look after him [a
workhouse infirmary patient] as a person who wants food and care and the
duty to look after him as a person who is employed in work in which the
guardians are authorized to employ him. But, after reflecting over this case,
I fail to see any distinction in principle between the obligation in one
respect and the obligation in the other... It seems to me it is all part of the
administration of the poor law relief, and that the action is not maintainable
either in the one case or in the other.10 9
In other words, guardians of the poor are not liable for injuries caused by the
negligence of union officers properly employed to discharge statutory duties
towards the poor. Thus did President Barnes allow the appeal and dismiss Mr.
Tozeland's action.
The case of Tozeland is interesting in at least two other respects. First, as
discussed earlier, the Court of Appeal affirmed that the doctrine of common
employment was not applicable under the circumstances of this case. The words
of Lord Farwell in this regard are instructive on the nature of workhouse
employment in general:
the doctrine of common employment has no application to the present case,
on the ground that such doctrine rests on the contractual relationship exist-
ing between master and servant, an implied term of which is that the ser-
vant takes the risks arising from his fellow-servants' negligence. In the
107. Supranote 99.
108. Ibid. at91; Tozeland, supra note 101 at 931.
109. Tozeland, ibid
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present case there is no contractual relationship, the guardians employ the
man in performance of their duty under the Poor Laws Acts . . . The
employment is therefore not contractual, but statutory.110
Lord Farwell elaborated further about the responsibilities that arise from work-
house relationships:
Whatever may be the rights of third persons against guardians, the relation
of the Local Government Board, the guardians and their officers, and the
paupers to one another is regulated by statute in such a manner that the
ordinary considerations arising out of the relation of principal and agent and
master and servant have no application.... the pauper works under statu-
tory compulsion, not under any contractual relationship.11 1
Lord Buckley agreed:
The proper administration of the poor law is, of course, a matter to be
enforced. The question, however, is whether a pauper, in an action brought
against the guardians in their corporate capacity, is a person capable of
enforcing it. In my opinion he is not. The guardians no doubt owe the duty
of providing the pauper with proper and sufficient food, with buildings of
proper construction, with proper sanitary arrangements, and the like. But, as
[a] matter of public policy, it would be impossible that a pauper should be
entitled to bring his action against the guardians for default to do so. That is
a matter to be controlled by the Local Government Board. 112
Finally on this point, it is worth considering the synopsis given by the leading
authority on the law of negligence at the time, Thomas Beven, the second edition
of whose book on negligence was relied upon by the Court of Appeal in
Tozeland. By the time the fourth edition had rolled off the presses, Mr. Beven
had this to say:
the soldier has voluntarily contracted himself out of his civil rights; the con-
vict has forfeited them; but parish relief is a phase of the State's economic
administration which in the interest of the community is dispensed where
there is no fault and sometimes no wish to receive it. The pauper, therefore,
does not lose any civic rights beyond those specified by legislation. In the
event of injury being inflicted on him he is in no other position than those
injured by the act of employfs in any other State department 13
110. Ibid. at 932 [emphasis added].
111. IbidL at933.
112. Ibid. at 935.
113. T. Beven, Negligence in Law, 4th ed., vol. 1 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1928) at 325.
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It therefore seems that workfare participants will be owed minimum duties from
the participating organizations for whom they perform labour. Unlike unions
and their guardians, however, participating organizations and their directors will
not be protected from the negligence of their employees because the organiza-
tions are not created by statute exclusively for workfare, but exist independently
thereof. They will therefore not enjoy protection from suit by workfare partici-
pants, and will be liable for any negligence of their employees-including
perhaps, the negligence of other workfare participants. Like the workhouse
cases, the doctrine of common employment does not apply because the principle
of freedom of contract is absent from this statutory compulsion of labour. This
means that "voluntary assumption of risk" is similarly inapplicable. Less clear
is whether the common law defence of contributory negligence is still available
to defend an action brought by a workfare participant. The general rule is that
persons are responsible for any harm that they cause to themselves: quod quis
ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur damnum sentire. However, in the
case of workfare this may be overshadowed by the involuntariness of the
participants' position in the first place, a notion which may do fundamental harm
to the principles underlying contributory negligence. Finally, like the workhouse
cases, employees of the participating organizations remain liable for any negli-
gence on their part that results in harm to a workfare participant.
It is possible that the position of service delivery agents will be different. Staying
within the rubric of the workhouse system outlined previously, it is imaginable
that as long as service delivery agents are acting within the course of their
statutory duties, they will be able to raise the defence of "statutory authority"
in suits by workfare participants. This defence would probably not be available
to participating organizations because they are under no legal obligation to
participate in workfare. But in any event, case law suggests that the courts would
be unwilling to allow this defence to protect a party negligent in the performance
of its duties.114
The second respect in which Tozeland is worthy of further note is with regard
to the discussion of the liability of guardians to third parties. While comments
to this end were obiterdicta, the Court briefly explored the liability of guardians
for harm arising from the actions of the workhouse. The role played in such
actions by paupers was not directly commented upon, but it can only be assumed
that actions of paupers in connection with their workhouse responsibilities
114. See Tock v. St. John's (City) Metropolitan Area Board, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1181, 64
D.L.R. (4th) 620, and Schenck v. Ontario; Rokeby v. Ontario (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 595,
131 D.L.R. (3d) 310 (Ont. H.C.). Nonetheless, this point should be reviewed carefully
before a decision is made to opt out of the workers' compensation system.
Workfare or Workhouse?
would be subsumed under the larger corporate identity of the workhouse. From
the judgement of Lord Buckley:
If the question were whether the guardians could be sued in their corporate
capacity in a civil action by a third party for such acts as nuisance by pollu-
tion, or by noise, or by interference with light, it may well be that an action
will lie.... The question there was not one of negligence in ministerial
duty, but one of injury to the property of a third party. 115
President Barnes also touched upon this subject, but really only to distinguish
some of the authorities put before him from the case at bar. Nonetheless, in the
cases he cited, the third-party plaintiff was allowed to recover. President Barnes
noted:
Again, that is a case of a claim made by an outside person, for a wrong
done by the board as a board, there being no relationship whatever between
the two parties to the action: it is an independent wrong. 116
And commented further:
They are cases of a claim by an outside person who has nothing to do with
the administration of the poor law relief, and who does not by virtue of his
coming in as a pauper place himself in any way under the provisions of the
statutes, and the question is quite different from that which arises in a class
of cases in which the person who is complaining is a person in the work-
house, whose relationship to the defendants is governed by the whole of the
statutes and regulations which relate to the administration of the poor law
relief. 117
Thus, even under the principles established by the more restrictive statutory
system of Poor Law England, participating organizations will face liability to
third parties for any harm caused by their workfare participants.
Finally, it must be noted that much of the common law decisions in relation to
paupers were based on public policy, which the courts interpreted as necessitat-
ing the restriction of the ability of paupers to sue for damages. It could be that
public policy as interpreted by the courts has become more sympathetic to
workers and the indigent since those days. On the other hand, a recent American
workfare case may suggest otherwise, in a situation where a workfare participant
115. Tozeland, supra note 101 at 934.
116. Ibid. at 928.
117. Ibid. at 932.
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was denied status as an employee for unemployment insurance benefits but not
for the purposes of workers' compensation:
Public policy encourages participation in work relief as a way of transfer-
ring employable persons from the welfare dole to the employment role. If a
participant is injured while on a work relief job, to deny him employee sta-
tus which then precludes his receipt of workers' compensation would dis-
courage participation in work relief-and undesirable effect. While to deny
employee status to work relief participants under the Unemployment Insur-
ance Code would have a beneficial effect-to encourage employment.118
Nonetheless, statutory intervention has significantly altered the employment
relationship since the time the workhouse cases were decided in England. In
reaching a decision today on these matters, public policy and the common law
in Ontario will surely keep pace with at least some of these changes, and not
rely strictly on century-old ideas and beliefs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Workfare constitutes employment under the common law, and workfare partic-
ipants are employees. However, devoid of context it is difficult to know who
the employer is. Workfare participants are also encompassed within the meaning
of "worker" under the OHSA and the WCA, both of which are remedial
legislation. The bigger question is who the employer is under each of these acts.
It was determined that participating organizations are the employers for the
purposes of the OHSA, with service delivery agents sharing liability for fulfil-
ment of the Act's provisions. For the purposes of the WCA, the service delivery
agents are the employers. Nonetheless, despite the WCA it may be possible for
workfare participants to maintain their civil rights to sue as a result of the special
nature of their employment relationship, in which case participating organiza-
tions and service delivery agents will be jointly and severally liable for damages.
Whether or not workfare is found to constitute employment for the purposes of
labour legislation, it is beneficial to have a deeper understanding of the nature
of workfare and its place in relation to our law. One method of pursuing this
task is to reason by analogy to the legal position of other classes of persons in
society, and this was done with regard to volunteers, occupiers' liability, and
workhouse paupers in Poor Law England.
Despite some suggestions to the contrary, workfare participants are not in the
same position as volunteers. The work that they perform is required of them in
118. Ghent, supra note 64 at 634.
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exchange for their benefits and is therefore not given of free will, which is
essential to a finding of voluntariness. Workfare participants are covered by the
Occupiers' Liability Act, however, and a "reasonable" duty of care is owed to
them under its terms. In all likelihood, this duty would be based on other existing
standards in the area, most notably, the OHSA. Finally, the position of workfare
participants is remarkably similar to that of workhouse paupers. The principles
enunciated in cases decided in that context serve as a very useful guide to
interpreting the nature of the workfare relationship today. The cases are espe-
cially important in making clear that persons who perform work in exchange
for social assistance do not thereby forfeit their civil rights nor do they take upon
themselves all of the risks associated with their work.
It was noted in the introduction to this article, and remains true at its conclusion,
that workfare is in a "legal grey area". Workfare participants perform labour as
a condition of eligibility for the social assistance benefits to which they are
entitled by law. There is an inherent lack of voluntariness in this arrangement,
which is fatal to any notion of a contract of employment. 119 Workfare partici-
pants are therefore workers sui generis, and as such require special legislated
standards. Absent such clarity, all parties to workfare-government, service
delivery agents, participating organizations, and participants themselves-face
uncertainty and a great deal of risk. As the most vulnerable of these parties and
the only one which has not participated voluntarily, ambiguities should be
resolved in favour of workfare participants, particularly in so far as it means not
detracting from their existing civil rights.
Furthermore, in legislating special standards for workfare participants, govern-
ments must not derogate from the rights and protections of ordinary wage-
labourers and citizens. Again, the compulsion underlying the workfare
relationship is the major reason for this. It would be inapposite to a labour system
essentially based on freedom of contract-yet which nonetheless recognizes the
need to legislate minimum standards-to then deny these standards to the
workers who are least free of all. 120
119. This is not to suggest that ordinary wage-labourers enter voluntarily into truly free con-
tracts of employment, especially when the official national unemployment rate hovers
around 10%.
120. While the question was not pursued in this article, it is worth noting that O.Reg. 384/96,
which excludes workfare participants from the ESA, does not appear to be subject to
the same type of challenge to its vires as does O.Reg. 383/96 under the OHSA. This is
because s. 84(1)(4) of the ESA allows for the exclusion by regulation of any "class of
employers or employees". Nonetheless, quaere whether workfare participants constitute
the type of class intended by the Act.
